Abstract Role-based a c cess control RBAC has recently received a lot of attention due to its exibility, expressive power and simplicity in administration. In RBAC permissions are associated with roles and users are made members of roles thereby acquiring the associated permissions. Centralized management of RBAC in large systems is a tedious and costly task. An appealing possibility is to use RBAC itself to facilitate decentralized administration of RBAC. The recently proposed ARBAC97 administrative RBAC '97 model identi es components called URA97, PRA97 and RRA97 for administration of user-role, permission-role and role-role assignments respectively. URA97 and PRA97 have already been described in detail in the literature, whereas RRA97 has so far not been de ned.
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The central contribution of this paper is to give a complete and formal de nition of RRA97, thereby completing the ARBAC97 model. The e ect of rolerole assignment is to construct a role hierarchy that is, a partial order in which senior roles inherit permissions from junior roles. Modi cations to the role hierarchy can have drastic impact on the e ective distribution of permissions to roles. At the same time we would like to decentralize this aspect of RBAC administration so that, for example, it should be possible for project security o cers to rearrange roles within a project without impacting other role relationships within the department in which the project exists. RRA97 shows how this goal can be achieved.
Introduction
Role-based access control RBAC has recently received considerable attention as a promising alternative to traditional discretionary and mandatory access controls. In RBAC permissions are associated with roles, and users are made members of appropriate roles thereby acquiring the roles' permissions. This greatly simpli es management of permissions. Roles are created for the various job functions in an organization and users are assigned roles based on their responsibilities and quali cations. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be granted new permissions as new applications and systems are incorporated, and permissions can be revoked from roles as needed. Role-role relationships can be established to lay out broad policy objectives.
In large enterprise-wide systems the number of roles can be in the hundreds or thousands, and users can be in the tens or hundreds of thousands. Managing these roles and users, and their interrelationships is a formidable task that often is highly centralized in a small team of security administrators. Because the main advantage of RBAC is to facilitate administration, it is natural to ask how RBAC itself can be used to manage RBAC. We believe the use of RBAC for managing RBAC will be an important factor in the long-term success of RBAC. Decentralizing the details of RBAC administration without losing central control over broad policy is a challenging goal for system designers and architects.
There are many components to RBAC SCFY96 . RBAC administration is therefore multi-faceted. In particular we can separate the issues of assigning users to roles, assigning permissions to roles, and assigning roles to roles to de ne a role hierarchy. These activities are all required to bring users and permissions together. However, in many cases, they are best done by di erent administrators or administrative roles. Assigning permissions to roles is typically the province of application administrators. Thus a banking application can be implemented so credit and debit operations are assigned to a teller role, whereas approval of a loan is assigned to a managerial role. Assignment o f actual individuals to the teller and managerial roles is a personnel management function. Assigning roles to roles includes aspects of user-role assignment and rolepermission assignment, but more signi cantly role-role relationships establish broad policy. Control of these relationships would typically be relatively centralized in the hands of a few security administrators. the e ective distribution of permissions to roles. The intuitive idea of RRA97 is to decentralize role-role assignment so that, for example, project security o cers can rearrange roles within a project without impacting other role relationships within the department i n which the project exists. A fundamental assumption in RRA97 is that there is a single global hierarchy o f roles which is known to all administrators.
The central contribution of this paper is to give a complete and formal de nition of RRA97, thereby completing the ARBAC97 model. The e ect of rolerole assignment is to construct a role hierarchy that is, a partial order in which senior roles inherit permissions from junior roles. RRA97 shows how this goal can be achieved. It is the rst attempt in the literature to give a comprehensive model for decentralized management of role hierarchies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the ARBAC97 model and, particularly, its URA97 and PRA97 components. We also brie y discuss the RBAC96 models on which AR-BAC97 is based. Section 3 gives a formal de nition of the RRA97 model and rationale for the design choices made here. Section 4 concludes the paper.
RBAC96 and ARBAC97 Models
This section gives a brief review of the RBAC96 and ARBAC97 models.
The RBAC96 Model
The well-known RBAC96 model SCFY96, San97 is summarized in gure 1. The top half of the gure shows the regular roles and permissions that regulate access to data and resources. The bottom half shows the administrative roles and permissions to regulate the administration of users, roles and permissions. A user is a human being, a role is a job function and a permission is an approval of access to some objects or a privilege to carry out a particular task. Sessions are related to one user and possibly to many roles for which the user is a member. The management of permissions and roles is greatly simpli ed by associating permissions to the roles and assigning the users to roles. In this way the users acquire the associated permissions. Roles are created for various job functions in an organization. The permissions required to carry out the job are associated to the roles. New permissions can be granted to roles as new applications and systems are incorporated. Unnecessary permissions can be revoked from the roles. Users are assigned to the roles depending on the responsibilities and quali cations and can be reassigned from one role to another. Role-role relationships can be established to lay out broad policy objectives of the organizations.
The ARBAC97 Model
Sandhu et al SBC + 97 h a ve outlined a comprehensive model for administration of RBAC i n c o n text of RBAC96. The model is called ARBAC97 and consists of three components which we describe brie y below. As stated earlier the RRA97 component of ARBAC97 is de ned for the rst time in this paper in the next section. A complete de nition of the URA97 and PRA97 components, and the intuitive motivation for these models,is given in SB97, SB98, SBC + 97 .
2.2.1 URA97 for user-role assignment URA97 was developed by Sandhu and Bhamidipati SB97 . It is concerned with the administration of user-role assignments. The basic idea is that administrative roles have authority to modify the UA relation of RBAC96. For example the administrative roles in gure 2b are authorized to modify the memberships of the roles in gure 2a. In these diagrams senior roles are shown at the top and junior ones at the bottom. Permissions are inherited upwards in the hierarchy. The power of a administrative role extends over some range of regular roles|identi ed by giving the top and bottom of the range, and indicating whether the top and bottom are themselves included in the range. Familiar interval notation is used for this purpose. Thus E1, PL1 =fE1, PE1, QE1, PL1g and E1, PL1=fE1, PE1, QE1g. A novel aspect of URA97 U, a set of users R and AR, disjoint sets of regular roles and administrative roles P and AP, disjoint sets of regular permissions and administrative permissions S, a set of sessions U A U R, user to role assignment relation AUA U AR, user to administrative role assignment relation P A P R, permission to role assignment relation APA AP AR, permission to administrative role assignment relation RH R R, partially ordered role hierarchy ARH AR AR, partially ordered administrative role hierarchy both hierarchies are written as in in x notation user : S ! U, maps each session to a single user which does not change roles : S ! 2 R AR maps each session s i to a set of roles and administrative roles roless i f r j 9r is that the user population that can be assigned by an administrative role to such a range is speci ed by means of prerequisite conditions as follows.
De nition 1 A prerequisite condition is a boolean expression using the usual^and _ operators on terms of the form x and x where x is a regular role i.e., x 2 R. For a given set of roles R let C Rdenotes all possible prerequisite conditions that can be formed using the roles in R. A prerequisite condition is evaluated for a user u by i n terpreting x to be true if 9x The simplest example of a prerequisite condition is simply a prerequisite, for example, the prerequisite condition ED requires membership in ED. The more complex condition ED^E2 speci es users from the engineering department who are not assigned to project 2.
De nition 2 User-role assignment and revocation are respectively authorized in URA97 by the following relations, can-assign AR C R 2 R and can-revoke AR 2 R with subsets of R identi ed by the range notation.
2
For example can-assignPSO1, ED, E1,PL1 authorizes members of the administrative role PSO1 to assign users who are already members of ED to the roles E1, PE1, QE1. Similarly, can-revokePSO1, E1,PL1 authorizes members of the administrative role PSO1 to revoke users from the roles E1, PE1, QE1. The exact semantics of revocation in this context is somewhat subtle and is discussed at length in SB97, SB98, SBC + 97 .
PRA97 for permission-role assignments
This component o f ARBAC97 deals with the assignments of permissions to roles. From a role-based , users and permissions have a similar character so PRA97 is an exact analog of URA97. The notion of a prerequisite condition is identical to that in URA97 except the boolean expression is now evaluated for membership and non-membership of a permission in speci ed roles. Analogous to URA97 we h a ve the following two relations to control permission-role assignment and revocation.
De nition 3 Permission-role assignment and revocation are respectively authorized in PRA97 by the following relations, can-assignp AR C R 2 R and can-revokep AR 2 R . 2 3 RRA97 Model for Role-Role Assignment
In this section we develop the RRA97 model, which is the central contribution of this paper.
Abilities, Groups and UP-Roles
For role-role assignment w e distinguish three kinds of roles, roughly speaking as follows.
Abilities are roles that can only have permissions and other abilities as members.
Groups are roles that can only have users and other groups as members.
UP-Roles are roles that have no restriction on membership, i.e., their membership can include users, permissions, groups, abilities and other UP-roles.
The term UP-roles signi es user and permission roles. We use the term role to mean all three kinds of roles or to mean UP-roles only, as determined by context. The three kinds of roles are mutually disjoint and are identi ed respectively as A, G, and U P R .
The main reason to distinguish these three kinds of roles is that di erent administrative models apply to establishing relationships between them. The distinction was motivated in the rst place by abilities. An ability is a collection of permissions that should be assigned as a single unit to a role. For example the ability to open an account in a banking application will encompass many di erent individual permissions. It does not make sense to assign only some of these permissions to a role because the entire set is needed to do the task properly. The idea is that application developers package permissions into collections called abilities which m ust be assigned together as a unit to a role.
The function of an ability is to collect permissions together so that administrators can treat these as a single unit. Assigning abilities to roles is therefore very much like assigning permissions to roles. For convenience it is useful to organize abilities into a hierarchy i.e., partial order. Hence the PRA97 model can be adapted to produce the very similar ARA97 model for ability-role assignment.
Once the notion of abilities is introduced, by analogy there should be a similar concept on the user side. A group is a collection of users who are assigned as a single unit to a role. Such a group can be viewed as a team which is a unit even though its membership may c hange over time. Groups can also be organized in a hierarchy. For group-role assignment we adapt the URA97 model to produce the GRA97 model for group-role assignment.
This leads to the following models.
De nition 4 Ability-role assignment and revocation are respectively authorized in ARA97 by can-assigna AR C R 2 A and can-revokea AR 2 A . 2
De nition 5 Group-role assignment and revocation are respectively authorized in GRA97 by can-assigng AR C R 2 G and can-revokeg AR 2 G . 2
For these models C Ris interpreted as the collection of prerequisite conditions formed using roles in U P R , and the prerequisite conditions are interpreted with respect to abilities and groups respectively. Membership of an ability in a UP-role is true if the UP-role dominates the ability and false otherwise. Conversely, membership of a group in a UP-role is true if the UProle is dominated by the group and false otherwise.
Assigning an ability to an UP-role is mathematically equivalent to making the UP-role an immediate senior of the ability in the role-role hierarchy. Abilities can only have UP-roles or abilities as immediate seniors and can only have abilities as immediate juniors. In a dual manner, assigning a group to an UP-role is mathematically equivalent to making the UP-role an immediate junior of the group in the role-role hierarchy. Groups can only have UP-roles or groups as immediate juniors and can only have groups as immediate seniors. With these constraints the ARA97 and GRA97 models are essentially identical to the PRA97 and URA97 models respectively. This leaves us with the problem of managing relationships between UProles. We use the term role to mean UP-roles in the rest of the paper.
The can-modify relation
Decentralization of administrative authority requires that members of di erent administrative roles should have authority over di erent parts of the hierarchy. Authority over a part of the role hierarchy implies autonomy in modifying the internal role structure of that part. That includes the creation and deletion of roles as well as the alternation of role-role reAdministrative Role UP-Role Range DSO ED, DIR PSO1 E1, PL1 PSO1 E2, PL2 2 Table 1 illustrates an example of can-modify relative to the hierarchies of gure 2. The meaning of can-modifyx, Y is that a member of the administrative role x or a member of an administrative role that is senior to x can create and delete roles in the range Y and can modify relationships between roles in Y. The examples in the rest of the paper are all in context of gure 2 and table 1. For purpose of our example we h a ve ignored PSO2 in this table and have instead authorized PSO1 to manage the roles of both projects. This illustrates how a single administrative role can be authorized to control multiple pieces of the role hierarchy.
The semantics of the four operations|create role, delete role, insert edge and delete edge|are described in subsequent subsections. Some of the important intuitive ideas are mentioned here in anticipation. In particular none of these operations is allowed to introduce a cycle in the hierarchy.
Creation of a new role requires the speci cation of its immediate parent and child in the existing hierarchy. Thus PSO1 can create a new role with immediate parent PL1 and immediate child E1, or a new role with immediate parent PL1 and immediate child PE1. Generally the immediate parent and immediate child must fall within the range or be one of the endpoints as speci ed in can-modify. Since creation of a role also introduces two edges in the hierarchy, it is not possible to use any t wo roles as the immediate parent and immediate child. Clearly we do not want this operation to introduce a cycle in this manner. As we will see we also impose additional restrictions to prevent undesirable side e ects of role creation.
Deletion of a role leaves relationships between the parents and children of the deleted role unchanged. So if DSO deletes E1, PE1 and QE1 continue to be senior to ED after deletion of E1. As such deletion does not pose a problem. However, deletion of E1 will leave dangling references in table 1, since the range E1, Pl1 no longer exists. In general, some roles are referenced in various relations in URA97, PRA97 and RRA97. If these roles are actually deleted we will have dangling references. Our approach is to prohibit deletion that would cause a dangling reference. Roles that cannot be deleted due to this reason can be deactivated so that they can be phased out later by adjusting the references that prevent deletion. Furthermore, when a role is deleted we need to do something about the users and permissions that are directly assigned to this role.
Insertion of an edge is meaningful only between incomparable nodes. Thus insertion of an edge from PL1 to E1 has no meaning, whereas insertion of an edge from PE1 to QE1 does. As well see there are edges that should not be inserted because they can lead to anomalous side e ects later.
Likewise deletion of an edge is meaningful only if that edge is not transitively implied by other edges. For example, deletion of the edge PL1 to E1 is meaningless and has no impact on the hierarchy. Deletion of the edge QE1 to E1 will change the hierarchy. Edge deletion only applies to a single edge and does not carry over to implied transitive edges. For example, deletion of the edge QE1 to E1 makes QE1 and E1 incomparable, but QE1 continues to be senior to ED.
More sophisticated forms of these operations can be constructed out of the basic ones de ned here. In these basic operations roles and edges are created and destroyed one at a time. This approach is analogous to the de nition of weak revocation in URA97 and PRA97 SBC + 97 from which v arious forms of strong revocation can be constructed. Similarly, in RRA97 more complex operations can be constructed in terms of these basic ones.
Restrictions on can-modify
The relation can-modify confers authority to administrative roles to change the role hierarchy. We would like to restrict this authority so as to maintain global consistency of authorization. The issue of dangling references has already been raised and RRA97 will not allow dangling references to occur. But this is not enough.
Consider the example of gure 3. Now if PSO1 who has authority o ver the range E1, PL1 makes PE1 junior to QE1 by i n troducing an edge the e ect is to indirectly introduce a relationship between X and Y roles. The role PSO1 does not have the authority to create this relationship, so this is an anomalous side e ect. We should either restrict the authority of the administrative role in our example DSO that introduced X and Y roles in the rst place, or PSO1 should be prevented from introducing relationships that makes PE1 junior to QE1 and indirectly Y junior to X. In general administrative roles are given autonomy within a range but only so far as the global side e ects are acceptable.
To formally state these restrictions on the authority of the administrative roles we i n troduce the concepts of authority range, encapsulated authority range and create range.
Concept of Range
The concept of range is very important in RRA97. It is formally de ned as follows. Note that a range, as de ned here, does not include the end points. In gure 2, E1, PL1, E2, PL2 and ED, DIR are di erent ranges. The range ED, DIR contains the roles which constitute ranges E1, PL1 and E2, PL2. We say ranges E1, PL1 and E2, PL2 are junior to range ED, DIR. 2
Note that incomparable ranges may h a ve one common end point.
Authority Range and Encapsulated Authority Range
The members of an administrative roles are authorized to modify certain range of roles in role hierarchy. These ranges are called authority ranges.
De nition 10 Any range referenced in the canmodify relation is called an authority range.
2
To ensure that administrative authority o ver authority ranges does not overlap, we introduce the following restriction.
De nition 11 In RRA97 authority ranges do not partially overlap.
Note that an administrative role may have more than one authority range. Table 1 shows that DSO has authority over the range ED, DIR. In gure 2 the authority range ED, DIR has two junior authority ranges, E1, PL1 and E2, PL2. Since these junior authority ranges are completely contained within the authority range for DSO, DSO has authority o ver these junior authority ranges as well. In other words DSO has inherited the authority o ver the ranges E1, PL1 and E2, PL2.
Our model allows an administrative role to have authority o ver more than one incomparable authority range. Table 1 shows that PSO1 has authority over two incomparable authority ranges namely E1, PL1 and E2, PL2.
Let us consider gure 3 again. To maintain consistency we observed that either DSO should not be allowed to create roles X or Y in the role hierarchy or PSO1 should not be allowed to make PE1 junior to QE1. In the latter case the autonomy of PSO1 to manage its authority range is interfered by DSO's actions. While this is a possibility w e pursue the former case here. Decentralization of authority and autonomy requires that all inward and outgoing edges from an authority range should only be directed to and from the end points of the authority range. The concept of De nition 12 A range x, y is said to be encapsulated if 8r1 2 x; y8 r2 6 2 x; y w e h a ve r2 r 1 , r2 y and r2 r 1 , r2 x . 2
Intuitively an encapsulated range is one in which all roles have identical relation to roles outside of the range. The intuition in RRA97 is that an encapsulated range is the correct unit for autonomous management of role-role relationships within the range. All authority ranges in RRA97 are required to be encapsulated. Figure 4 and 5 respectively show examples of encapsulated and non-encapsulated range x, y. As discussed earlier creation of a role requires speci cation of the new role's immediate parent and child. If the immediate parent and child are the end points of an authority range, there is no di culty. More generally we wish to allow creation of a new role such that its immediate parent and child are within the authority range rather than being at the end points. Thus PSO1 can create a new role with parent PL1 and child PE1. However if DSO exercises this power we can end up with up the undesirable situation illustrated in gure 3. To prevent this from happening we i n troduce the following notions.
De nition 13 The immediate authority range of role r written AR immediate r is the authority range x, y such that r 2 x; y and for all authority ranges x', y' junior to x, y we h a ve r 6 2 x Note that only comparable roles constitute a createrange. Consider gure 6. Let B, A and x, y be authority ranges whereas x', y' is not an authority range. The ranges marked by the dotted lines, i.e., r3, A, x, A and B, y are create ranges. However r1, A or r2, A do not satisfy the conditions and thereby are not create ranges.
In RRA97 we require that the immediate parent and child of a new role must be a create range in the hierarchy prior to creation of the new role.
Roles can be created outside the authority ranges or without a parent or child only by the chief security o cer. In general the chief security o cer can do arbitrary modi cations.
Role Deletion
Deletion of roles in a hierarchy is a complicated process. Our assumption is that a role in an authority range can be deleted by the administrator of that range. It does not matter how this role got there.
ARBAC97 de nes some authorization relations such as can-assign, can-revoke and can-modify. If the roles speci ed as end points of the role ranges of these relationships are deleted, we will leave dangling references to non-existing roles. The ranges with these deleted end points will become meaningless. To a void this problem RRA97 provides two alternatives.
1. Roles referred in can-assign, can-revoke and canmodify relationships cannot be deleted. Though it is a more restrictive constraint but it is required to keep the range referential integrity i n tact. 2. Roles referred in 1 above can be made inactive explained in the next paragraph whenever it is needed to delete them. The advantage of deactivating roles is that it avoids references to nonexisting roles and at the same time achieves the purpose of deletion.
A role is said to be inactive if a user associated to it cannot activate it in a session. The edges to and from the inactive role, its associated permissions and assigned users remain unchanged. While a user assigned to an inactive role cannot activate it, the permissions associated with that role are still inherited by senior roles. In this way the hierarchy is not changed but at the same time a partial e ect of deletion is achieved.
RRA97 allows both of the above alternatives. Regular users cannot invoke inactive roles, but administrators can revoke users and permissions from these roles. These roles can be made empty but cannot be deleted from the hierarchy until the references preventing deletion are suitably adjusted. Other roles in the role hierarchy can be deleted.
In case of deletion of a role we need to preserve the permissions and users assigned to the role. RRA97 provides two alternatives for deletion of roles. 2. Delete role but at the same time take care of the assigned permissions and associated users as follows: assign permissions to the immediate senior roles and assign users to immediate junior roles.
Edge Insertion
Now let us explain how the model deals with the insertion of edges in the role to role relationships. The insertion of transitive edges has no e ect so we only consider edges inserted between incomparable roles. When an edge is inserted we m ust ensure that encapsulation of authority range is not violated. We have the following rules.
The roles between which the edge is inserted must have same immediate authority range, or if the new edge connects a role in one authority range to a role outside the range encapsulation of the authority range must not be violated.
For example in gure 5 assume edges y, r3 and r3, x are initially not present, and that x, y and B, A are authority ranges. Insertion of the edge y, r3 does not pose any problem. However in presence of this edge, insertion of edge r3, x violates encapsulation of authority range x, y, hence it must not be allowed. Similarly in the presence of r3, x the edge y, r3 would not be allowed. This leads to the following formal de nition for insertion of an edge. 
Edge Deletion
The deletion of a transitive edge does not change the hierarchy, so their deletion is meaningless. In RRA97 we consider only those edges for deletion that are in transitive reduction of the hierarchy. If edge AB is not in the transitive reduction then it is not a candidate for deletion. 2 For example in gure 7 deletion of the edge SQE1 to JQE1 will change the hierarchy. Edge deletion only applies to a single edge and does not carry over to implied transitive edges. As discussed in the general rules for edge deletion RRA97 keeps intact transitive edges after deletion. For example, deletion of the edge SQE1 to JQE1 makes SQE1 and JQE1 incomparable, but SQE1 continues to be senior to E1 and JQE1 junior to PL1 shown in gure 8.
There is one special case that needs to be considered. If the edge being deleted is between the end points of an authority range, deletion of the edge will disrupt the authority range and cause inconsistency in the model. Hence this operation is disallowed.
Conclusion
This paper de nes the RRA97 model thus completing the de nition of ARBAC97 started in SBC + 97 . RRA97 is very di erent from the URA97 and PRA97 components of ARBAC97 which h a ve been previously reported in the literature. RRA97 provides for decentralized administration of role hierarchies. This desire is to give administrative roles autonomy within a 2 Other models and applications do not have this restriction. For example, Oracle allows insertion and deletion of transitive edges KL95 . range but only so far as the side e ects of the resulting actions are acceptable. To d o s o w e need to disallow some operations authorized by the authority range, thereby tempering the administrative role's authority. We have formally identi ed these restrictions in the paper and have provided their motivations. RRA97 is the rst model to deal with these issues.
